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Abstract
The Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) is the predominant component in IPv6; the next generation internet protocol providing for
stateless address auto conﬁguration of nodes (SLAAC), resolution of link layer addresses and neighbor unreachability detection.
The stateless address auto conﬁguration is designed for self conﬁguration of nodes and achieving plug and play support for network
devices. The protocol is rooted on the assumption that network consists of trusted nodes, however with emergence of public wireless
networks; any node can join the link with minimal authentication and the condition changes drastically. With no inclusion of central
address conﬁguration servers or trusted authorities, the process is vulnerable to malicious activities. The attacker can impersonate
legitimate nodes and launch Man-in-the-Middle (MITM), Denial of Service (DoS), and other network related attacks. The access
to the link can be blocked and the network trafﬁc can be redirected without the knowledge of users. To overcome the above
problem, RFC 3971 suggests the use of Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) which is an innate component of Secure
Neighbor Discovery (SEND). Although CGA provides for message integrity, authentication and mitigating address impersonation,
the process is computation intensive with higher bandwidth consumption and harbors some other limitations. This paper presents a
novel technique for address generation having a minimal computation cost as compared to CGA. The technique generates a highly
randomized Interface Identiﬁer that helps maintain nodes privacy and allows the nodes to ascertain the uniqueness on the link.
It also provides robust security against DoS attacks during the DAD process of IPv6 SLAAC.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of organizing committee of the Eleventh International Multi-Conference on Information
Processing-2015 (IMCIP-2015).
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1. Introduction
Internet Protocol Next Generation (IPng) or IPv6 dispenses an agile and supple architecture framed to vanquish the
limitations of IPv4. It provides a ﬂexible architecture upon which network services and applications can be deployed1.
The main driving force in the evolution of IPv6 was the exhaustion of IPv4 address space. While IPv4 extensions
like NAT, CIDR worked for limited short term scenarios, the features and solutions required by the modern internet
cannot be fully provided by IPv4. The IPv4 lacks in deployed security infrastructure and entails rapid growth of
routing tables. The solution lies in the ultimate migration to IPv6. IPv6 protocol is based on 128 bit address providing
2128 i.e. practically unlimited number of addresses for each and every device on the earth. The rapid expansion of
the protocol maintains the end-to-end connectivity principle by banishing the requirement for NAT2. Additionally,
IPv6 also provides a strong QoS support with the help of Flow Label and Trafﬁc Class ﬁelds in packet header. IPv6
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has a simpliﬁed packet header which aids in faster convergence of routing packets. The implementation of IPSec has
been made mandatory in the form of extension headers. IPSec being an intrinsic element of IPv6 achieves end-to-end
security and provides for conﬁdentiality, data integrity and authentication with the help of Encapsulating Security
Protocol (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)4. The Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) being a part of Internet
Control Message Protocol for IPv6 (ICMPv6) is one of the intrinsic components of IPv65 and uses ICMPv6 message
format6. The protocol provides several services like discovering nodes in the neighborhood, resolving their link
layer addresses (congruent to ARP in IPv4), determining routers in local link, maintaining reachability information
and identifying any duplicate addresses. However the protocol is not immune to attacks. The NDP is based on the
assumption that all nodes on the local link are trustworthy. The assumption doesn’t hold good in case of wireless
networks where any node can join the link with minimum authentication. The malicious user could craft MITM attack
where in legitimate trafﬁc to the node could be redirected. This usually happens when the user’s neighbor cache is
poisoned with spoofed Neighbor Advertisement messages of ND Protocol. The malicious users could also launch
DoS attack against Duplicate Address Detection Process in IPv6 Stateless Address Auto conﬁguration impeding the
legitimate nodes from joining the link.
This paper explicates discussion over the IPv6 Stateless Address Auto conﬁguration Mechanism and explains the
problems associated with it. The main aim of this paper is to propose a new address generation technique having
a minimum computational cost and time complexity as compared to CGA. The technique maintains nodes privacy
and is also secure against DoS attack during the Duplicate Address Detection phase. In particular, the technique is
effective in mitigating duplicate addresses in local subnet. The remaining paper is structured as follows. Section 2
explains IPv6 Stateless Address Auto Conﬁguration process. Section 3 will propound on IPv6 privacy issues and the
drawbacks of earlier approaches. Section 4 will discuss about Duplicate Address Detection attack in IPv6 SLAAC
process. In Section 5 we introduce our proposed address generation technique which is effective against DoS attacks
in SLAAC. Section 6 implements and evaluates our approach. Finally in Section 7, we summarize our conclusions.
2. IPv6 Stateless Address Auto Conﬁguration (SLAAC)
The IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) is an indispensable component used for critical functions such as
auto conﬁguration, detecting end systems on the local link, resolving link layer addresses and obtaining network
preﬁx values. Among the key functions is the IPv6 SLAAC (Stateless Address Auto Conﬁguration) which forms
an integral component of Neighbor Discovery protocol15. The auto conﬁguration of networks is the key to reduce
operational deployment cost and improve the overall network design7. A variety of network topologies including
Ethernet are self-conﬁgurable. The self conﬁguration provides provision for Plug and Play support for network devices
and as such increases the number of network elements that can join the link. In general auto-conﬁguration increases
the self-sufﬁciency of network devices by taking considerable amount of management functions and without relying
on the central or additional conﬁguration servers. SLAAC adds a unique characteristic in IPv6 networks. In IPv6,
a node conﬁgures its address through one of the following ways1: using manual or ﬁxed address conﬁguration, stateful
disposition using DHCPv6 or stateless auto conﬁguration. In static/manual address conﬁguration, the node conﬁgures
its address using the conﬁguration ﬁle present on the system. Stateful conﬁguration makes use of DHCPv6 servers
which maintain database of IP address assignments.
The Stateless Address Auto conﬁguration is a decentralized mechanism unlike DHCPv6. The potential of stateless
auto conﬁguration mechanism to operate without involving any central address conﬁguration servers or trusted
authorities makes it an ideal choice for users12. In SLAAC, when a node joins a link; it autonomously generates its Link
Local Address (LLA) and sends a Neighbor Solicitation message to corresponding solicited node’s Multicast Address.
The solicited node’s multicast address is created by extracting low-order 24 bits of link local address and afﬁxing those
bits with preﬁx FF02:0:0:0:0:1: FF. For Example, if we have our link local address as FE80::2CB:DA:EC37:8D4A,
then its equivalent solicited node’s multicast address would be FF02::1: FF37:8D4A. This process ascertains the
uniqueness of its generated Link Local Address (also known as Duplicate Address Detection check). However,
if another node in the network with the same Link Local Address exists, Neighbor Advertisement message is sent
back to the source node to inform it about the Duplicate Address Detection. If Duplicate address is not found, the
source node assumes the address to be unique and therefore progresses to acquire the network preﬁx value. This is
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Fig. 1. IPv6 SLAAC process. Fig. 2. EUI-64 interface identiﬁer generation.
done by directing a Router Solicitation Message with destination set to FF02::2 (All routers on the Local Link). The
network preﬁx value is obtained from the Router Advertisement message sent by the routers to FF02::1 (All nodes
Multicast Address), for enabling a node to form its Global Unicast IP address. This process is depicted in Fig. 1.
Address Collisions are very unlikely to be encountered during the auto conﬁguration mechanism unless there is an
attack being leveraged. This is because the interface or host identiﬁer unit of address is formed with the help of unique
48 bit hardware address (used when the Interface Identiﬁer is generated using EUI-64) or with randomized interface
identiﬁer obtained by applying a Pseudorandom function.
3. IPv6 SLAAC Privacy Implications
An IPv6 address is comprised of two elements; a 64 bit network preﬁx and a 64 bit Interface Id. A standard for
generating the 64 bit Interface Id (IID) has been proposed by IEEE standards association8 known as EUI-64 (Extended
Unique Identiﬁer). They are created by the combination of 36 bit OUI (Organizationally Unique Identiﬁer) which
is allocated by IEEE RA (IEEE Registration Authority) and 28 bit extension identiﬁer allocated by the hardware
manufacturers. The bits 7 (Universal/Local (U/L) bit) and 8 (Individual/Group (I/G) bit) of the leftmost byte of EUI are
set to one. This resultant forms a 64 bit interface identiﬁer. However if we have only 24 bit OUI and 24 bit extension
identiﬁer (i.e. a 48 bit MAC address), then a IEEE reserved hexadecimal value (0xFFFE) is inserted between the third
and fourth byte to form a 64 bit EUI. For example; if we have a node with MAC address equal to 00-42-21-68-7E-5A,
then by embedding FF-FE into the middle of 48-bit MAC address and inverting the uniqueness bit to 1 will result
in 64-bit IID 0242:21FF:FE68:7E5A. Thereafter by concatenating Network preﬁx FE80:: with the IID results in the
formation of Link Local Address FE80:: 0242:21FF:FE68:7E5A. This shown in Fig. 2. This method of interface
id generation has some privacy issues and drawbacks. Using MAC address for generating Interface Id (IID) results
in the formation of a static IID which does not change over time. This issue makes it vulnerable to some privacy
attacks. The attackers can have enough time to track the node by capturing the network trafﬁc. Once the node gets
identiﬁed, the attackers can launch different types of attacks. To resolve this issue, RFC 4941 “Privacy Extensions for
Stateless Address Auto conﬁguration” suggested the use of Randomized Interface Identiﬁers that change over time.
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Two techniques for generation of IID were proposed. The ﬁrst mechanism requires the presence of a stable storage
area. A node chooses the IID value from history value of the preceding iteration of the algorithm. If stable storage is
absent i.e. implying no history value; then node chooses a randomized value. The IID value so obtained is combined
with the EUI generated value. The node computes the MD5 message digest over the quantity created in previous step.
Thereafter it extracts 64 leftmost bits of the MD5 message hash and sets leftmost bit 7 to zero indicating the local
signiﬁcance. The node then compares the generated identiﬁer against a list of reserved IID’s and to those already
assigned. If a match occurs, 64 rightmost bits of the message digest are saved to history and algorithm restarts. If match
doesn’t occur; it will use this as ﬁnal IID.
In the absence of a stable storage area, no history value is available and must be generated randomly by using a good
pseudorandom number generator function. A number of different approaches are possible10; for example the nodes do
have conﬁguration information (e.g. user id, security keys, serial numbers etc) that vary from one machine to another.
This information can be appended with some random data and the MD5 hash can be computed. The main drawback
with privacy extension approaches is that they fail to prevent IP spooﬁng attacks and are unable to provide proof of
address ownership by a node. To overcome this; the approach may be to use a Cryptographically Generated Address
(CGA) which generates a randomized IID rooted on node’s public key. CGA’s are used to provide address ownership
proof and to avert IP spooﬁng. However CGA implementation may not be suitable because they require a node to
have a set of Public/Private keys. Thus the nodes can still be identiﬁed by their public key. Also CGA generation is
a computationally intensive task and may not be feasible. The drawbacks and discussions on using different privacy
extension mechanisms and techniques are further explained in9,11.
4. Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) Attack in SLAAC
As discussed before, in order for a node to validate the uniqueness of its generated link local address, the node must
execute the Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) process. Since the SLAAC process assumes that network consists of
trusted nodes, this may create avenues for malicious activities and serve as a launch pad for attacks. One such attack is
the Denial of Service (DoS) attack on IPv6 SLAAC13. In this attack, a node trying to generate an address for itself may
be blocked from forming such an address by a malicious user in the network. For example; if an attacker is successful
in responding i.e. sending Neighbor Advertisement (NA) to every Neighbor Solicitation (NS) message (during the
DAD process) sent by a new node, the node may not be able to obtain the address. This is shown in Fig. 3.
The attacker can assert ownership of address in one of two ways14. The attacker can reply with a NA message
indicating that the address is already been assigned. The attacker can reply with a NS message indicating that it is
also performing the DAD process for the same address. In that case, both the nodes should drop the address and wait
Fig. 3. DAD attack in IPv6 SLAAC.
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for some time until the new address is generated. The new address should again be veriﬁed using DAD15. Repeated
acknowledgements to generate link local addresses may deny the new node from joining the link and the node would
thus remain uninitialized. A substantial amount of research is being done to address this issue with the focus on
mitigating and discovering new preventive mechanisms. The earlier NDP architecture mandated for utilizing the IPSec
services to shield NDP messages; however there are some potential problems like bootstrapping, because Internet Key
Exchange (IKE) entails for a working IP stack14. To conﬁgure security associationsmanually in IPSec is a cumbersome
and unrealistic task considering the bulk amount of messages in NDP. Therefore before using IKE, the nodes should be
addressable and must have a valid IPv6 address. RFC 397117 deﬁnes the use of SEND (Secure Neighbor Discovery)
protocol for protecting IPv6 SLAAC. SEND offers features like address ownership claim mechanism, NDP message
protection and router authorization. The SEND protocol comes with four different option headers like CGA, RSA
Signature, Nonce and Timestamp. To counter DoS attack in IPv6 SLAAC, it was proposed that CGA along with
signed DAD and NA messages should be used. These messages are subject to validity check and if the validation fails,
the node simply drops the NA message. However the protocol is yet to attain a maturity level given the overheads
associated with the protocol, which result in DoS itself. The CGA-DAD messages can be subjected to DoS attacks
using CGA or non-CGA addresses. Further discussion on CGA constraints can be found in6,9, 11. Raﬁee et al. in18, have
implemented the SEND protocol for the windows platform. Although claiming to be the ﬁrst SEND implementation
for windows, the approach suffers the drawback of being platform speciﬁc and thus requires adding an update in every
individual host to support it. However, there are some limitations for executing the attacks like having access to the
link and replying with NA message well before the value of RetransTimer variable has expired.
4.1 The SEND approach
As discussed above, IPv6 SLAAC is susceptible to malicious threats and attacks. To counter these challenges, RFC
397117 mandates the use of SEND as a security extension to Neighbour Discovery Protocol. The protocol introduces
four different options (CGA, RSA Signature, Nonce, and Timestamp) and two new ICMPv6 messages (CPS and
CPA) which aid in providing address ownership proof mechanism, message integrity/identity and authorization of
routers. Despite its innumerable tangible beneﬁts, SEND faces major challenges including intense computation, vast
implementation, deployment and security issues.
• Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA)
The CGA is an innate component of SEND protocol used to prevent address impersonation. CGA authenticates
IPv6 addresses without requiring installation of third party services or additional servers. CGA’s are computed by
cryptographic one way hash function applied on public key and auxiliary data structure23. The process certiﬁes that
IPv6 address is bound to the public key it uses. This binding can later be veriﬁed by re-computation of hash digest and
comparing it with Interface Identiﬁer (IID) of the IPv6 address. CGA’s can also be used for authentication and proving
that sender of the packet is the actual owner of the packet. For this, the packet has to be signed by sender’s private key.
The public key, signature and auxiliary parameters are then sent with the packet to the receiver. The receiver can then
verify the signature and conﬁrm the sender of the packet is owner of CGA. The CGA algorithm begins by generating
owner’s public key and choosing a proper sec value. Then Hash-2 evaluations occur in a loop until a ﬁnal modiﬁer
value is obtained. The Hash-2 value is obtained by applying SHA-1 over the CGA data structure (128 bit randomly
generated modiﬁer, 64 bit subnet preﬁx, 8 bit collision count, public key, extension ﬁeld). The generation function
tries different modiﬁer values until 16 × sec leftmost bits of Hash-2 equals zero. Once the ﬁnal modiﬁer is found,
the loop terminates and it serves as an input for Hash-1 calculation. From Hash-1, IID is derived and value of sec is
encoded in its three leftmost bits. Finally DAD process is executed to ensure the address uniqueness. CGA’s ﬁnd their
main application in mitigating Denial-of-service attacks during the IPv6 SLAAC process. Today CGA’s are even used
in mobile computing security. A node proves address ownership by using its private key to sign the DAD and ND
messages that it sends. The main disadvantage of CGA is its computational cost involved in Hash-2 calculations. The
sec value ranges from 0 to 7. Using a sec value greater than 1 result’s in exceptionally longer address generation time.
To impersonate a given node by using brute force search takes an average of O (216×sec+59) hash function evaluations.
However on the other hand, address owner tries O (216×sec) iterations to ﬁnd the right modiﬁer value that satisﬁes
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Hash-2 condition. Another drawback of CGA is that it’s not certiﬁed. The attacker can create a new valid CGA and
start the communication. The attacker can thus impersonate other node addresses from a valid public key but cannot
sign the other node’s messages.
5. Proposed Technique
In this section; we introduce our technique which generates a highly randomized interface identiﬁer needed for
maintaining privacy. The technique guides through the address generation process and is secure against the DoS attacks
during IPv6 Duplicate Address Detection phase in SLAAC. The technique is based on the assumption that by making
Interface Identiﬁer very difﬁcult to approximate, the attacker will be unsuccessful in determining node’s location and
hence unable to leverage attacks on the node. The technique is composed of two parts; address generation which is
done at the sender node (the node which sends the neighbor solicitation) and address veriﬁcation which is carried at
receiver node (the node that processes the neighbor solicitation sent by other node). We also assume that validity of
IID is for a limited time period after which that node generates a new IID. This step increases the complexity level for
attacker thereby making it arduous to guess the address of the new node and thus prevent eavesdropping. To generate
a unique and robust link local address, the node needs to perform the following steps:
Acronyms used
Cc = Collision−Count, Uf = Uniqueness−Flag, NS−cc = Neighbor−Solicitation−Collision−Count,
Rn = Random−number, Ts = Current−Timestamp, IID = Interface−Identiﬁer, LLA = Link Local Address,
T−IP = Target−IP−Address, CRn = Concatenated−Random−number, T−IP−IID=Target−IP−Interface−Identiﬁer,
R−LL−IP = Received−Link−Local−IP, RT−IID=Received−Target−IP−Interface−ID
At sender node
1. Set Cc = 0, Uf = 0, NS−cc = 0.
2. Set Rn = 64 bit random number (by Pseudo random number generator).
3. Set CRn = Concatenation of [Cc, NS−cc, Ts and Rn] where Ts is the current timestamp of the system.
4. Apply SHA-1 to CRn and put result in Hash-1.
5. Break Hash-1 into two equal parts: Sub−Hash-1 and Sub−Hash-2.
6. Form IID by concatenating 20 MSB of Sub−hash-1, 20 MSB of Sub−hash-2 and 24 LSB of original 64 bit
Random number i.e. Rn.
7. Concatenate 64 bit Link Local Network preﬁx FE80:: with IID to form 128 bit LLA (Link Local IP address).
This address is the temporary generated Link Local IP Address of the node. This will be become permanent after
executing duplicate address detection.
8. Apply SHA-1 to IID and put result in Hash-2.
9. Form T−IP−IID for Target IP address ﬁeld of ICMP header by concatenating 40 MSB of Hash-2 and 24 LSB of
Generated 128 bit Link Local IP address (LLA). The 40 MSB of generated IID in step 6 are now encrypted. Save
the value of T−IP−IID to ﬁle. The value is used later for sending Neighbor Acknowledgments for nodes that are
soliciting for generated addresses.
10. Concatenate 64 bit Link Local Network preﬁx FE80:: with T−IP−IID to form 128 bit T−IP ﬁeld of ICMP header.
This is the Target IP address of ICMP header.
11. Perform DAD (Duplicate Address Detection) on T−IP i.e. Send Neighbor Solicitation (NS) for T−IP. This T−IP
is veriﬁed by nodes for duplicate address that receive the multicast transmission. The actual address that is
being veriﬁed are 40MSB of generated IID in step 6 which are encrypted in the form of 40MSB of T−IP−IID.
The source address of IP packet header will contain unspeciﬁed address (::) because the node is doing DAD. The
destination address will be set to solicited node multicast address corresponding to target IP address (T−IP). The
value of generated T−IP will be placed in the target address ﬁeld of NS message. Hence 40MSB of IID generated
in step 6 are actually encrypted.
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12. If Neighbor Advertisement (NA) for sent T−IP is Received Then
a. Copy the value of Source Link Local IP address ﬁeld in Received IP header and Put it in R−LL−IP.
b. If R−LL−IP = Generated 128 bit LLA Then
I. If Cc = = 3 Then
Set Uf = 1
Else
I. Increment Cc by 1
II. Goto Step 2.
End
Else
I. Set Uf = 1
End
Else
I. Set Uf = 1
End
In this step; if some other node in the network has generated same address, the source node will receive the Neighbor
Advertisement and the condition 12(b) is checked. If it matches and if the value of collision count equals 3, then it’s
probably an attack. If the value of collision count is not equal to 3, then collision count is incremented by one and
process repeats from step 2.
13. If Neighbor Solicitation (NS) for Generated LLA is received Then
a. If NS−cc = = 3 Then
I. Set Uf = 1
Else
I. Increment NS−cc
II. Goto Step 2
End
End
This step is carried because an attacker in addition to sending Neighbor Advertisement for asserting ownership of
address can also send Neighbor solicitation indicating that it’s also performing DAD process. To overcome this
problem, we introduce a variable NS−cc which tracks how many times address collision occurs. If the collision
happens more than 3 times, then it’s probably an attack.
14. If Uf = 1 Then
Generated LLA is Unique and valid.
End
In Step 12 and 13 above; the heuristic solution for determining that an attack is being executed is by checking whether
the value of Cc or NS−cc has reached three. This is based on the fact that probability of two nodes generating same
address based on the values of Cc, Ns−cc in Timestamp ‘Ts’ is very low. Bagnulo et al.19 shows that probability of
occurrence of two nodes in network generating identical interface identiﬁers is given by:
Pb(n, k) ≤ 1 −
(
n − k + 1
n
)k−1
where n = number of address combinations possible, k = total number of interfaces on the same link. In our case;
n = 240, and we assume the value of k = 1000; this gives us the probability as Pb (240, 1000) = 9.076e− 7. This is a
very small probability and thus validates heuristic theory. Thus encountering address collisions three times as indicated
by Cc or NS−cc variables is a clear indication of malicious activity.
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Table 1. Comparison of CGA and proposed technique.
Address-Generation Time (μs) Address Veriﬁcation RSA Key Generation Total Time
Sec = 0 Sec = 1 Sec = 0 Sec = 1 1024 bits Sec = 0 Sec = 1
CGA 290μs 4881μs 132μs 210μs 220μs 642μs 5311μs
Proposed Technique 190μs 112μs -n/a- 302μs
At receiver node
The following algorithm is executed by only those nodes that have already joined the link and have a valid IP
address. It is used for Processing Received Neighbor Solicitation for Duplicate Address Detection.
1. Extract 64 bit Interface Identiﬁer from Target IP address ﬁeld in Received ICMP header of Neighbor Solicitation
and Put it in RT−IID
2. Obtain the value of T−IP−IID from ﬁle and compare it with RT−IID. The value of T−IP−IID has been generated
during its address generation phase when the node had joined the link.
3. If T−IP−IID = = RT−IID Then
I. Send Neighbor Advertisement and inform the node that address already exists.
Else
I. Discard Received Neighbor Solicitation.
End
6. Implementation and Evaluation
Our technique is executed on a machine running windows 7 operating system using language C#.net. The machine
has 4GB of Ram and 2.5GHz Intel i5 processor. For performance evaluation and comparison, we also implemented
CGA algorithm on our system. CGA also provides for address security and maintenance of privacy. Both the address
generation algorithmswere executed 20 times and average value was calculated. In our experiment, we do not consider
the time spent in sending Neighbor Solicitation and reception of Neighbor Advertisement because that depends on
network bandwidth and speed which may vary over time. The results are shown in Table 1 below.
As shown in Table 1, our proposed technique does not require the overhead of generating RSA keys as compared to
CGA. This results in faster computation of interface identiﬁer without processing bottlenecks. Our proposed technique
takes a total time of 190μs for address generation and 112μs for veriﬁcation. In our approach, if an attacker claims
for a valid address generated by other node, he will have to provide exact value for IID that is sent to him in encrypted
form in NS message. Even if dictionary attack is executed to search for hash pair values, it will require a database
space for storing 240 hash pair values. Searching such a large number of records for a match will take considerable
amount of time and such a large space may not be feasible. Since we are also assuming that node will maintain IID for
a limited period of time; this approach makes it extremely difﬁcult for an attacker to eavesdrop on the link. Also in our
approach, it’s very unlikely that other node will have used the same value for Cc, NS−cc and Ts while generating the
address unless there is an attack being leveraged upon. For CGA, we are using RSA key size of 1024 bits. With sec
value equal to 0, it takes 220μs for RSA key pair generation, 290μs for address generation and 132μs for address
veriﬁcation adding a total time of 642μs. For sec value greater than 0, the computational time increases exponentially.
Here we are not considering the overhead of signature generation time for CGA, which is required for signing DAD
messages. The robustness of CGA hinges on the value of sec but there is a tradeoff. If node needs robust security,
higher value of sec should be used but that result in higher computational time which is not feasible. Using a sec value
greater than zero, the brute force search takes an average of O (216×sec) iterations to satisfy the Hash2 condition in
CGA. For an attacker to break the CGA, cost of the brute force search takes O(216×sec+59) iterations11. If focus is on
performance, lower sec value should be preferred which means compromising on security.
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7. Conclusion
Security has been the prime motivation in the design of IPv6 protocol.While IPv6 has banished the shortcomings of
its earlier predecessor, it has also introduced some parlous issues that require elaborate solutions. This paper discussed
the IPv6 SLAAC process and highlighted some of its critical issues related to privacy and security. The paper also
proposed a novel and highly randomized technique for address generation that safeguards node’s privacy and asserts
address uniqueness on the link. The technique has a minimal computational cost and provides robust security against
DoS attacks during the DAD process. For comparative performance analysis, we compared our technique with CGA
algorithm. The results show that proposed technique improves computational time as compared to CGA. Since our
technique uses SHA-1 hash encryption which is vulnerable to collisions attacks, as a part of our future work, the
technique can be improved by using SHA-256 hash encryption. Also instead of RSA, Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) can be used for public key generation. ECC uses shorter key size for the same level of security as RSA.
This results in faster address generation. The technique can also be enhanced to mitigate other attacks like Address
Spooﬁng, Man-in the-Middle and Router Authorization in order to secure the neighbor discovery protocol in IPv6.
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